Cyber Information Sharing - Beyond Detect
Threat information sharing is recognised as an important and evolving topic within cyber security. The need for organisations to collaborate for the protection of IT systems is in part driven by the highly collaborative and diverse ecosystem of threat actors, with an ever greater overlap of tools, techniques and teams targeting public and private sectors alike. Where organisations effectively share experiences and insights that may be unique to them, broader communities can benefit at scale –a rising tide lifts all boats.
Much has been done to improve the sharing of threat intelligence both nationally through the NCSC (National Cyber Security Centre) Cyber Information Sharing Platform, as well as within specific communities of interest. However, it continues to be recognised that more needs to be done, as reflected by initiatives such as the Financial Sector Cyber Collaboration Centre announced last year.
Calls continue for government, or specifically NCSC, to share more advanced threat intelligence given their unique visibility of the evolving threat landscape. However balancing the risks associated with information disclosure relating to both vulnerabilities and evolving adversary capabilities will always create a practical limit to both the speed and extent to which this can be done.
Evolving Cyber Defence
There is however another area in which NCSC possesses unique capability that is both valuable to industry and easier to share, but to date has been in far less demand. Threat intelligence sharing is primarily about detection and response, however with its role as National Technical Authority, much of NCSC’s guidance as delivered to government is focused initially on defence. After all, architecting systems that are well protected and minimise the likelihood of compromise is the first step to a successful detection and response strategy.
Three or so years ago, in the pre-NCSC era, very little of the architectural advice for government’s classified networks would have translated as being relevant to the needs of much of the private sector. Government systems were typically built as bespoke, expensive and exhibiting poor usability. All system requirements were subservient to security - an approach which ironically often undermined security. In recent years, government has evolved out of necessity to make better use of modern technology and meet the expectations of a modern workforce. This has required looking to the private sector for innovation, developing collaborative and agile relationships with the supply base to both validate and influence technology, and developing novel network architectures that combine an array of defences to balance security requirements with the cost, usability and flexibility sought.
As a result, many of the newer government systems, even those that operate at higher levels of classification, now leverage commercial technology to offer the levels of functionality, flexibility and usability that private sector employees would be familiar with, whilst still achieving the levels of security required for sensitive government systems. However, as far as information sharing is concerned, relatively little has been done to date in terms of more broadly communicating the innovations and experiences gained within government in recent years.
Towards Informed Risk Management
As one would expect, cyber-related IT transformation within government has been achieved by advances at both the product and architectural levels, driven by both the world-leading expertise that NCSC possesses, as well as the shift within exemplar government departments towards informed and effective risk management. The resulting ‘defence in depth’ architectures allow departments to proportionately manage the risks they care about, in part by employing products that provide a high degree of assurance against well-articulated security claims - claims that can be independently validated. High assurance products deployed within appropriate architectures allow risk to be quantified in a way that is difficult to achieve in systems that are primarily reliant on probabilistic defences – be that signature or other forms of anomaly detection. Such technologies may be necessary but are not sufficient for achieving well quantified and well managed technical risk in today’s diverse and evolving environments that encapsulate cloud, mobile big data, IoT and the myriad of technology trends that even the most security conscious organisations need to adopt at pace.